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 In the Republic, Socrates describes the good as the end of all human action: 
“Every soul pursues the good and does what it does for its sake. It divines that the good is 
something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is or acquire the sort of 
stable beliefs it has about other things, and so it misses the benefits, if any, that even 
those other things may give.”1 I wish to examine how humans act for the sake of the good 
in the sections of the Republic following this passage. Human action is oriented toward 
the good in several distinct ways, one of which is illustrated by the procedures of 
mathematics in pursuing knowledge: without intending to achieve insight into forms such 
as the square itself, we can act for the sake of achieving this end.  
The most familiar way to describe action for the sake of the good involves what I 
will call agency-centered teleology. It tells us that an action is for the sake of an end only 
if the agent has an awareness of the end as his goal and acts in a way that shows an 
awareness of how his actions promote that goal.2 All human beings desire what is good, 
and they pursue it differently on the basis of their greater or lesser cognitive grasp of the 
good. An action is explained by referring to a desire for some end and a belief which 
represents that goal as attainable by some action.3 The discussion of mathematics in 
Books VI and VII of the Republic deserves our attention because it reveals a different 
way of acting for the sake of an end. The prospective guardians of Socrates’ best city 
study mathematics in order to achieve an understanding of the good, but they do so 
without intending or believing that this study will lead them to this understanding. Their 
study of mathematics produces understanding of the good, but this is an unforeseen and 
unintended end. As we will see, this way of performing an action for the sake of an end 
that is not intended is illustrated more concretely by a passage from the image of the line, 
where mathematicians are said to make arguments about visible images for the sake of 
understanding a form such as the square itself. 
 A quick examination of the pages following the claim at 505d-e that all humans 
act for the good reveals three different ways in which we act for the sake of the good. 
Some pursue the good from the mistaken belief that it consists in pleasure or knowledge 
or some other lesser good. These people act for the sake of the good by pursuing what 
seems falsely to them to be the good. They would not accept pleasure or knowledge if 
they were aware that it only seemed to be the good but in reality was not the good itself.4 
                                                
1 Republic 505d11-e4. All translations from the Republic, unless otherwise noted, are by Grube. 
2 The terminology and underlying concepts used here to describe agency-centered teleology are taken from 
André Ariew, “Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments,” in Functions: New Essays in 
the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology” ed. André Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman (New 
York: Oxford, 2002), 8-10. 
3 This strategy for explaining action goes back to Aristotle and is present in contemporary philosophy of 
action inspired by Donald Davidson. Actions are explained by citing the reasons for which they are 
performed, and these reasons consist in a belief-desire pair, of which the desire provides the goal and the 
belief describes how the goal may be attained. Alfred Mele provides the following account of a reason for 
which an action is done: “Any reason for which a person acts has a conative element that motivates the 
pursuit of a goal or a subgoal and a representational element that constitutes a plan, or an element of a plan, 
for achieving the pertinent goal or subgoal.” See Mele, The Springs of Action (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 110. 
4 Rep. 505b-e. 
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A second way of seeking the good involves possessing true beliefs about the good, a 
possibility Socrates mentions when Adeimantus asks him to state what he believes 
concerning the good. Finally there is a third and best way of pursuing the good, in which 
we act for the sake of the good on the basis of full insight into the form of the good. This 
best state is required of the guardians in the best city, who act for the sake of the form of 
the good by gaining knowledge of the form and then using this knowledge as a paradigm 
for their own conduct: “And once they’ve seen the good itself, they must each in turn put 
the city, its citizens, and themselves in order, using it as their model.”5  
These three modes of acting for the sake of the good are examples of agency-
centered teleology: they involve the universal desire for the good conjoined with either 
false belief, true belief, or knowledge about the good. However, this is not a complete 
specification of the various ways in which humans act for the sake of the good. The 
guardians-to-be, those potential philosopher-rulers who are still making the ascent toward 
the good but have not yet reached it, must count as instances of the general truth that all 
human beings act for the sake of the good. Yet their manner of acting for the sake of the 
good is not captured by any of these three modes of acting for the sake of the good. The 
ascent toward the good is accomplished by extensive training in various mathematical 
technai. These fields of study do not qualify as knowledge in the strict sense because they 
do not examine and account for their basic principles and starting points, the hypotheses 
mentioned at 510b5 –c6 and 533c1, but still they provide access to true belief rather than 
falsehood. Nor can these actions be performed on the basis of knowledge about the good. 
This knowledge is achieved only at the summit of the ascent, and our concern is to 
explain how the philosopher-rulers act for the good before gaining this knowledge.  
Several passages indicate that it is not in virtue of their true beliefs that the young 
guardians act for the sake of the good. Socrates disparages the value of true belief when 
Adeimantus asks that he share his beliefs about the good: “Haven’t you noticed that 
beliefs without knowledge are shameful and ugly things? The best of them are blind – or 
do you think that those who express a true belief without understanding are any different 
from blind people who happen to travel the right road?”6 If the guardians in training have 
only true belief about the good, they will lack an account of the cause of the various good 
things they enjoy. They will lack an understanding of the form of the good, since belief 
concerns the many just or good things but not the one form of justice or the form of the 
good (479d-e). Since they will lack understanding of the form of the good, any success 
they have in reaching this overarching cause of all that exists will be a matter of luck, like 
blind men who happen by chance to find the right road to their destination. If this is how 
the guardians act for the sake of the good in their education, then their ability to reach 
their end would be purely a matter of chance. More than this is needed for the guardians’ 
training and for their action to be oriented toward the good.  
 These observations direct us toward the task of specifying the cognitive state of 
the guardians by virtue of which they act for the sake of the good as they are educated 
toward the good. The cognitive state in question must fall short of knowledge of the 
good, since that is the end that is not yet attained during this education, but be higher than 
true belief, which is oriented toward the good only by chance. Socrates’s ranking of the 
different intellectual powers in the image of the line suggests thought or dianoia as the 
                                                
5 Rep. 540a-b. 
6 506c6-9; Grube’s translation amended. 
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logical candidate, since it is said to be between belief and understanding (511d4-5). 
Dianoia is the faculty by which we come to know the mathematical sciences, and 
Socrates prescribes an intensive training in mathematics for the guardians as a prelude to 
knowing the good. Mathematical study contributes to understanding the form of the good 
by directing the soul away from the visible realm and towards the intelligible: “Then it 
[geometry] drags the soul towards truth and produces philosophic thought by directing 
upwards what now we wrongly direct downwards” (527b9-11; see also 523a, 525a-c, 
526b). This feature of mathematical study within the education of the guardians is 
uncontroversial; less clear is its connection with acting for the sake of the good. In what 
sense do the guardians engage in these mathematical studies for the sake of the good, if 
mathematics studies such value-neutral entities as numbers and plane figures?  
 Much of our understanding of dianoia must rely on 510b2-511b2, in which 
Socrates discusses the third section of the divided line. The third section of the line, or the 
first section of the intelligible realm, contains the objects grasped by dianoia while the 
fourth contains those understood by dialectic. The third section is of special concern for 
us, since the guardians in training will employ dianoia as they study the objects contained 
in this section.7 We learn that dianoia is compelled to start from hypotheses which 
mathematicians lay down as things known, that dianoia employs images, and that it does 
not ascend to a nonhypothetical first principle. Concerning the mathematicians’ use of 
images, Socrates speaks as follows:  
…[A]lthough they use visible figures and make claims about them, their 
thought isn’t directed to them but to those other things that they are like. 
They make their claims for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal 
itself, not the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the others. These 
figures that they make and draw, of which shadows and reflections in 
water are images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those 
others themselves that one cannot see except by means of dianoia. 
Mathematicians employ visible objects and make claims about them while thinking about 
other objects, apparently forms such as the square itself, to which the visible objects bear 
a likeness. The use of visible figures or diagrams is an exercise of dianoia carried out for 
the sake of a form, which is the phenomenon that interests us.  
                                                
7 I wish to avoid commitment on the much-discussed issue of what exactly these objects are. Some 
commentators identify these contents as forms, either strictly mathematical forms such as the square itself 
or a more extensive range of forms: A. S. Ferguson, Plato’s Simile of Light,” Classical Quarterly 15, no. 4 
(1921), 131-52; R. Hackforth, “Plato’s Divided Line and Dialectic,” Classical Quarterly 36, no. 1 (1942), 
1-9, and Richard Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), 192-20. 
Others restrict the contents of the third section to the so-called mathematicals, the plurality of abstract 
squares or diagonals which mathematicians cognize. See J. Adam, The Republic of Plato (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1902), vol. II, Appendix I to Book VI and Anders Wedberg, Plato’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics (Stockhom: Almquist & Wiksell, 1955), 99-111. On the first reading, the 
difference between the third and the fourth sections of the line, and between the realms discerned by 
dianoia and understanding respectively, is a difference of intellectual method but not of objects. On the 
second, a distinct class of objects as well as a distinct method corresponds to each section of the line. Plato 
does not describe the line in sufficient detail for us to resolve the question of whether the third section of 
the line contains its own class of objects. This indicates that he is concerned more with the ultimate result 
and end of dianoia, namely understanding mathematical forms, than with the issue of whether the 
understanding is obtained directly or is mediated by grasp of the mathematicals. In either case, we must 
face the question of how mathematical inquiry occurs for the sake of insight into mathematical forms.  
Payne East 07 p. 4 
 
  As a first step towards explicating the notion of making a claim about a visible 
object for the sake of a form, we can rephrase this as a matter of making a claim about a 
visible object for the sake of a conceptual grasp of the form. With regards to a form, what 
we can achieve by our study is not the existence of the form or any modification of its 
condition. As a form, it exists independently of those who think of it. The relevant 
product of mathematical inquiry that can qualify as that for the sake of which the inquiry 
is pursued is the student’s own comprehension of the form.  
 How does working with visible figures help the student of geometry to gain an 
apprehension of a form? Geometers posit various figures as their hypotheses, so we can 
suppose that they posit the existence of squares, though they do not think it necessary to 
say what it is to be a square (510c2-d1). Working with an intuitive sense of what a square 
is and what properties it possesses (all four sides of a square are of equal length) they 
draw diagrams of squares and use these images to prove various results about the squares 
they draw. By inspection of a diagram of a square and one of its diagonals, the 
mathematicians can convince themselves that a square can be divided into two equal 
triangles. Already by this point in a “proof” of a trivial conclusion, our mathematicians 
are thinking of entities other than the ones they draw and see: the two equal triangles are 
not the same as the two triangles drawn in the diagram, which are most likely not fully 
equal. The square which the two equal triangles constitute will also not be the same as the 
one that is drawn. This acquaintance with a square that is not seen but is known by 
dianoia can then stimulate more focused reflection on what makes this thing a square and 
what it is to be a square. Success in answering these questions will lead to some 
apprehension, direct or indirect, clear or obscure, of the square itself. So dianoia 
performs the crucial task of turning the soul from the visible to the intelligible realm.8  
However, we still must explain how visible squares are studied for the sake of 
understanding the square itself. It is not enough merely to assert that examining one sort 
of object leads to or causes understanding of another; if I study mathematical diagrams by 
drawing them on a blackboard with chalk, this may cause me to learn about the properties 
of chalk, but I did not study mathematical diagrams for the sake of insight into chalk. It 
cannot be the case that mathematicians study diagrams for the sake of gaining insight into 
the square itself by virtue of intending to gain insight into the square itself. This insight 
into the square itself is the result of mathematical investigation, and not one of its 
preconditions. As Socrates describes the procedures of the mathematicians, they begin by 
positing squares and other figures as hypotheses, but they neglect to give an account of 
what these figures are. The grasp of these hypotheses does not amount as insight into the 
forms. It is only after examining diagrammed squares and making claims about them 
gaining insight into the square itself is recognized as a task by the students of 
mathematicians. Because mathematicians lack awareness of forms as they begin their 
inquiry, we cannot treat their studying diagrams for the sake of understanding forms as a 
case of agency-centered teleology.9  
                                                
8 This presentation of mathematical study leading to insight into the square itself follows Michael Morgan, 
“Belief, Knowledge, and Learning in Plato’s Middle Dialogues,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
Supplementary Volume IX (198?), 63-100, and Ian Mueller, “Mathematical Method and Philosophical 
Truth,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 170-99. 
9 Typically commentators discuss 510d7-8 and the notion of studying images for the sake of understanding 
forms as a case of setting out with the desire or intention of learning about the forms. John Brentlinger says 
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 An explanation of how mathematicians study diagrams for the sake of 
understanding forms will draw upon several causal and normative relations between 
studying diagrams and understanding forms. First, the acts of studying diagrams must 
help cause or produce the understanding of forms as a result. Second, this result must be 
of greater value that its cause; to do x for the sake of y implies that, in this context at 
least, y is more worth having than x. Finally, that this understanding of forms results must 
be a criterion of success in studying diagrams. Studying chalk diagrams may produce 
knowledge of chalk, but this result is no criterion of success for mathematical study. To 
summarize formally these three conditions, suppose that I is a field of intellectual inquiry 
and F is some form. Then the following three conditions describe formally the relation 
that holds between the particular actions of studying diagrams and understanding the 
square itself, such that the former are performed for the sake of the latter: 
C1 Studying I produces understanding of F 
C2 Understanding F is of greater value than studying I 
C3 If studying I is done in the best way, then it produces understanding of F10 
These conditions are satisfied by the description of mathematical inquiry at 510b-511b. 
The process of making claims about visible squares plays a causal role in producing 
understanding of the square itself. This understanding is more valuable than the process 
of working with diagrams. The third condition summarizes Socrates’s views on the 
limitations of mathematical practice and how these limitations can be overcome. He 
believes that reliance on hypotheses which are not themselves known through an account 
places limits on the status of mathematics as knowledge. The claims that mathematicians 
make rest on unexamined assumptions that squares exist as certain figures with a list of 
properties (internal angles of 90 degrees, all sides equal, etc.). With the knowledge of the 
square itself, this qualification can be lifted. A mathematician who knows what a square 
is and how this is connected to a square’s essential properties will derive many of the 
same conclusions about squares as does the mathematician who relies only on 
hypotheses, but the former’s conclusions will enjoy a higher epistemic status. The form-
knowing mathematician has “destroyed the hypotheses” (533c8) by replacing them in the 
structure of his investigations with knowledge of the square itself.11 Without insight into 
the square itself, this non-hypothetical practice of mathematics is not possible. As a 
result, a necessary condition for making arguments about squares in the best way is 
achieving insight into the square itself.  
                                                                                                                                            
of this passage that it “unequivocally asserts that the dianoietic sciences seek to know the forms…”; see 
Brentlinger, “The Divided Line and Plato’s Theory of Intermediates,” Phronesis 8 (1963), 149. The 
passage does assert unequivocally that forms such as the square itself and the diagonal itself are what 
mathematical sciences allow us to think about. But the sense in which these sciences seek those forms is 
equivocal. Mathematicians do not seek the forms by setting out to learn about them; they seek them rather 
in the sense that the understanding of forms, once gained, upholds the claims to knowledge that 
mathematicians make. 
10 This description of the relation between studying mathematics and achieving understanding of forms was 
inspired by reflection on Richard Kraut’s description of the for-the-sake-of relation in Book I of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. See Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), 200-1. 
11 This account of the limitations of typical mathematical practice and their remedy by knowledge of forms 
draws upon Richard Hare, “Plato and the Mathematicians” in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. 
Renford Bambrough (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), 21-38. 
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 This suggests that mathematicians study visible squares for the sake of the square 
itself in the following way. They begin with hypotheses about squares and other figures 
that lack the status of knowledge. As they use visible squares to solve particular problems 
and to draw conclusions about squares, they do not anticipate or plan to gain insight into 
the square itself. They do, however, claim to know the entities they hypothesize as well 
as the conclusions they draw from study of visible squares – they posit their hypotheses 
“as if they knew them” (510c6). Insight into the square itself is an unintended result of 
this mathematical inquiry, a result that allows mathematicians to fulfill their epistemic 
ambitions. Achieving this result flows from the proper pursuit of their inquiry and is the 
crucial step needed for mathematicians to make good on their claims to knowledge. In 
this sense, their use of images and study of visible diagrams is carried out for the sake of 
an end they do not intend, namely insight into forms. 
 Our original question was the following: How do the guardians-to-be act for the 
sake of the good? Now we can answer this question in light of our account of how 
mathematicians study diagrammed squares for the sake of understanding the square itself. 
As was mentioned, Socrates requires his prospective guardians to complete an extended 
course of mathematical studies. His rationale for this is that mathematics drags the soul 
away from the visible realm and toward the intelligible, a process that culminates in the 
vision of the form of the good. This result produced by mathematical study is surely of 
greater value than the act of studying itself. And achieving this result is a criterion of 
success in mathematical study. As Socrates says of harmonics pursued in the proper way, 
“it’s useful in the search for the beautiful and the good. But pursued for any other 
purpose, it’s useless” (531c6-7). With knowledge of the good the guardians can 
understand all else as flowing from a nonhypothetical first principle, and so vindicate 
their claims to mathematical knowledge. It is in this sense that the guardians exercise 
dianoia for the sake of the good; they need not intend to gain knowledge of the good.
Payne East 07 p. 7 
 
 
